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The environmental impact review laws-the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) I and its state counterparts 2-are pre-
mised on the idea of full and open disclosure. The notion
underlying these laws is that if the government and the public are
fully informed of the impacts of and alternatives to proposed ac-
tions, they will make wise decisions about whether and how to pro-
ceed.3 The Freedom of Information Act4 and its state counterparts 5
even more explicitly seek to open up governmental deliberations to
the public. Considered together, these two types of laws would lead
one to believe that secrecy has little place in the assessment of envi-
ronmental impacts.
6
Although this supposition is logical, it is not the practical real-
ity. The practice, in contrast with the theory of impact review, is
suffused with secrecy. Although this Article focuses on the dynam-
* Member, Berle, Kass & Case, New York; Lecturer, Columbia University
School of Law; Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
B.A., 1972, Columbia University; I.D., 1978, New York University School of Law.
Mr. Gerrard is General Editor of the six-volume ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRAC-
TICE GUIDE (1992); co-author of ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REVIEW IN NEW
YORK (1990); co-author of the monthly environmental column in the NEw YORK
LAW JOURNAL; and editor of the monthly ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN NEWV YORK
newsletter.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
2 These "little NEPAs" are enumerated in 2 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.08[2] (1993).
3 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
4 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
5 All the state freedom of information laws are reprinted in JUSTIN D. FRANK-
LIN & ROBERT F. BOUCHARD, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND PRIVACY ACTS (1986 & Supp. 1993).
6 A third type of law with a related purpose is the "open meetings" or "sun-
shine" law, which requires that meetings of government bodies be open to the pub-
lic. New York has such a law, the Open Meetings Law, N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW
§§ 100-111 (McKinney 1988). A discussion of it is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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ics of secrecy in the impact statement process in the state of New
York, its conclusions and recommendations for reform are applica-
ble to other states throughout the country, as well as to the federal
system.
Secrecy in the impact statement process results from the inter-
action of several factors: the common practice of environmental im-
pact statements (EISs) being prepared by project applicants; the
long delays at most agencies in responding to document requests;
the growing reluctance of the New York State Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation (DEC) to hold adjudicatory hearings on
permit applications; and the great judicial deference afforded agen-
cies that have approved EISs. In reviewing EISs, the courts defer
very heavily to the lead agencies, which in turn rely very heavily on
the project applicants. Since the applicants can significantly influ-
ence the presentations of their technical consultants, 7 project critics
are relegated to the periphery on the key substantive issues. Thus
the full disclosure purposes of New York State's "little NEPA," the
State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), 8 are often
frustrated.9
These tendencies are not as evident at the federal level under
NEPA, primarily because agencies, not private applicants, prepare
EISs under NEPA.10 However, a federal agency seeking to build a
7 The precise influence that an EIS author exerts on the contents of the EIS
does not appear to have been the subject of much study. However, there has been
considerable commentary on the analogous issue of the difference between risk as-
sessments on hazardous waste sites performed by consultants hired by EPA versus
those performed by consultants retained by potentially responsible parties (PRPs).
Much of this commentary posits that consultants working for PRPs downplay
risks. E.g., E. Donald Elliott, Superfund: EPA Success, National Debacle?, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1992, at 11. This hypothesis is supported by empiri-
cal findings that show that cleanups in which PRPs take the lead are less stringent
than those in which EPA takes the lead. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
U.S. CONGRESS, COMING CLEAN: SUPERFUND PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED 5-6
(1989); GAO Says Private Parties Select Containment Remedies More Often Than
EPA, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 724 (1992). Due to concern over bias, EPA has at-
tempted to take over the supervision of risk assessments from PRPs. Shift of Risk
Assessment Authority to EPA Has Negligible Effect on Duration, Agency Says, 23
Env't Rep. (BNA) 3170 (Apr. 16, 1993); Superfund: Potentially Responsible Parties
May Conduct Risk Assessments at Some Sites, EPA Announces, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 843 (Sept. 10, 1993); D.C. Circuit Asked to Remand EPA 'Rule' Eliminat-
ing PRP Role in Risk Assessments, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1530 (Dec. 7, 1990).
8 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984).
9 Under the California Environmental Quality Act, that state's equivalent of
SEQRA, the applicant typically prepares the EIS. See Friends of La Vina v.
County of L.A., 284 Cal. Rptr. 171 (Ct. App. 1991).
10 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(b) (1992). See Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal
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dam or an office building will have motivations similar to those of
private project applicants. Thus, even at the federal level, agencies
themselves often have the same self-interests as applicants.
I
THE NATURE OF THE SECRETS
This Article focuses primarily on the secrecy of raw data-the
calculations and the assumptions underlying the technical conclu-
sions presented in EISs. For example, suppose that a developer
wants to put up a new building in Syracuse, New York where high
levels of carbon monoxide have been measured in the ambient air.
If the traffic generated by the new building is found to cause or
worsen violations of federal air quality standards for carbon monox-
ide, construction of the building might violate the Clean Air Act.
Typically, the developer will hire a consulting firm to prepare the
EIS for the project. A local agency-perhaps the Syracuse city
planning department-will become the lead agency in supervising
the SEQRA process. However, the lead agency generally will not
become very deeply involved in EIS preparation. Instead, it will
rely on the developer and the developer's consultants to accumulate
the raw data and draft the EIS.
In predicting the impact of the project on carbon monoxide
levels, the developer's consultants will use a series of mathematical
models that rely on a number of inputs such as:"1
" How much traffic will be generated by the project?
* How much of that traffic will use single-occupancy vehicles,
carpools, buses, bicycles?
" What time of day will the traffic occur?
" What routes will the traffic use?
" What other buildings will have been erected in the area by
the time the proposed project is finished?
" What will their traffic impacts be?
" What will be the average age of the automobiles that will
travel to and from the building? Will the automobiles have modern
Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
11 See generally LARRY NV. CANTER, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
49 (1977); ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS HANDBOOK ch. 3 (John G. Rau
& David C. Wooten eds., 1980). See also Charles D. Case, Problems in Judicial
Review Arising From the Use of Computer Models and Other Quantitative Method-
ologies in Environmental Decision-Making, 10 B.C. ENvTL. AnF. L. REv. 251
(1982).
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emissions control equipment? How well will the automobiles be
maintained, especially their emissions control systems?
0 When the project is built, will the conditions of the roads be
better, worse, or the same as they are now?
* What weather conditions will prevail? Will the emissions be
well dispersed by the winds, or will they remain in the same area,
and for how long? During the winter will the temperature be so low
that the cars will have to warm up for an extended period?
0 What are the existing levels of air quality at the key
locations?
Several dozen more items could be added to this list. At every
one of these points, and at many others not enumerated here, the
analyst has discretionary choices to make. Some of these choices
are constrained by guidance documents from government agen-
cies; 12 some are not constrained; and others are ambiguously con-
strained. But throughout the process, the analyst applies "best
professional judgment." If that judgment is consistently applied in
one direction, it may well show that the building will cause a viola-
tion of Clean Air Act standards. If the professional judgment is
consistently applied in the other direction, the calculations may
show just the opposite.
Thus, where the developer hires the consultant-as is almost
invariably the case under SEQRA-the discretionary choices will
tend to be made in one particular direction. In environmental im-
pact statements for projects in New York City, for example, almost
no EISs have predicted that the projects will cause violations of air
quality standards, except in a very few instances where, despite the
most favorable assumptions, the absence of violations could not
plausibly be projected.
Similarly long strings of assumptions arise in assessing many
other types of impacts-for example, the impact of a landfill in a
river on a fish population; the health risk from construction of an
incinerator; and the noise impact of a highway. All of these assess-
ments involve the repeated application of best professional judg-
ment by experts.
Few lead agencies have resources to examine those judgments.
For large projects, the City of New York is sometimes able to
12 In December 1993, the Mayor's Office of Environmental Coordination in
New York City released CITY ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW TECHNICAL
MANUAL, designed to dictate the methodologies for answering many of the above
questions for EISs where a New York City agency is the lead agency.
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devote significant professional expertise to the review of an EIS.' 3
That, however, is the exception. More typically, the lead agency,
like a town planning board, may have a junior planner who is rather
intimidated by the luminaries who have written the EIS, who may
make three or four times his or her salary, and whose ranks the
junior planner hopes to join some day. Once a judgment on a sub-
stantive impact is enshrined in an EIS, the nominal decision-making
body may find its hands tied, and it may be unable to act contrary
to that judgment.
14
As a result, very often the only people who are inclined to ex-
amine, test, and take apart these judgments are project opponents.
But to do that, even if the opponents have (as few do) the necessary
resources and sufficient funds to hire outside experts, the opponents
still need the data, the assumptions, and the calculations that went
into the applicant's predictions. The principal mechanisms they
have for getting that information are EISs and the New York State
Freedom of Information Law (FOIL).15 As will now be shown,
however, these mechanisms have significant shortcomings.
II
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWv
In theory, a wide range of information is quickly available
under FOIL. FOIL requires agencies to furnish requested informa-
tion within five business days,16 but in reality this process often
takes months. It is not uncommon for a requester to wait a year or
two to feceive documents. After some time passes, one can file an
administrative appeal asserting that nonresponse is effectively a de-
nial, 17 and occasionally this may speed matters up. Some time later,
13 See Ellen M. Spindler, Reforming New York City's Environmental Quality
Review (CEQR): Site-Specific Adjudicative Zoning Approvals, I N.Y.U. ENVTL. L
J. 62, 73-74 (1992).
14 The leading example arose in a controversy over the construction of several
radio transmission towers near the Hudson River. The EIS, prepared by the appli-
cant's consultants and approved by the town planning board, concluded that the
towers would have no adverse aesthetic impact. The planning board later at-
tempted to deny approval for the towers on the grounds they would have a nega-
tive aesthetic impact. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the annulment of
the planning board's decision on the grounds that it was not supported by substan-
tial evidence. WEOK Broadcasting Corp. v. Planning Bd. of the Town of Lloyd,
592 N.E.2d 778 (N.Y. 1992).
15 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84-90 (McKinney 1988).
16 Id. § 89.3.
17 Id. § 89.4(a).
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one can sue to force a response,18 and the agency bears the burden
of proving why a record should not be disclosed.1 9 But this litigious
path faces several practical constraints:
0 The comment period on EISs can be as short as thirty
days, 20 and it is essentially impossible for an applicant to go
through the entire FOIL request and appeal process in such a short
period of time;
* State and local agencies are able, simply by filing a notice of
appeal, to obtain an automatic stay from the enforcement of a judg-
ment against them. 21 Thus, even if a lawsuit is brought and the
plaintiff wins, the plaintiff may not be able to enforce the judgment
and obtain the information until all appeals have been exhausted-a
process that can easily take two years or more;
* Few citizen organizations have the resources to bring law-
suits under FOIL, because the value of the information sought is
uncertain, and because their resources are already stretched by se-
curing representation on the more substantive and passionate envi-
ronmental issues of concern.
Agencies employ several excuses for not producing requested
documents. Among the most common is the exemption for inter-
agency or intra-agency documents, 22 under which agencies often
withhold drafts and sometimes fail to designate internal reports as
"final," keeping them in perpetual draft form. The attorney work
product privilege is another common excuse for not producing re-
quested documents. 23 Moreover, although information must be
produced in computer-readable form if possible,24 agencies have
been known to provide computer data but not the codes necessary
to decipher them. Some agencies also claim that information is the
property of their consultants and cannot be obtained. These ex-
cuses are often invalid,25 but by the time they are finally declared as
Is Id. § 89.4(b).
19 Capital Newspapers v. Bums, 67 N.E.2d 665, 667 (N.Y. 1986).
20 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.8(c) (1993).
21 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 5519(a)(1) (McKinney 1991).
22 N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 87.2(g) (McKinney 1988).
23 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 3101(c) (McKinney 1991).
24 Brownstone Publishers, Inc. v. New York City Dep't of Buildings, 560
N.Y.S.2d 642 (App. Div. 1990).
25 See Westchester Resco Co., L. P. v. Jorling, RJI No. 01-92-ST3502 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 1992) (involving resource recovery plant operator who sued DEC
to block release of plant operating reports, claiming they contained trade secrets
exempt from the FOIL; court dismissed petition, finding that most of the informa-
tion was publicly available elsewhere).
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such, the opportunity for citizen participation in governmental ac-
tion has often passed.
In
SEQRA
The State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) 26 re-
quires that all state or local agencies (with very few exceptions)
"shall prepare, or cause to be prepared by contract or otherwise an
environmental impact statement on any action they propose or ap-
prove which may have a significant effect on the environment."
27
This appears to be, and in fact is, a very broad mandate. The
threshold for preparing an EIS under SEQRA is considerably lower
than that under NEPA,28 and the courts have broadly construed
the EIS mandate, frequently striking down agency decisions not to
prepare an EIS.29 However, there are several exemptions, and two
in particular have shielded many important actions from environ-
mental review.
The first exemption is for "civil or criminal enforcement pro-
ceedings, whether administrative or judicial, including a particular
course of action specifically required to be undertaken pursuant to a
judgment or order."' 30 The New York State DEC frequently allows
existing landfills and other controversial facilities to operate and
even to expand under the rubric of a consent decree. In a leading
case, a vertical expansion of a major landfill on Long Island was
ordered by DEC, and the New York Court of Appeals confirmed
that no EIS was necessary. 31 Using the same technique, New York
City's mammoth Fresh Kills landfill on Staten Island has continued
to operate without ever having received a construction or operation
permit from DEC, or ever having been the subject of a final EIS.
The other major exemption from preparing an EIS under
SEQRA is for "emergency actions which are immediately necessary
on a limited and temporary basis for the protection or preservation
26 N.Y. ENvrL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984).
27 Id. § 8-0109(2).
28 Chinese Staff & Workers Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 502 N.E.2d 176, 180 (N.Y.
1986) (comparing EIS requirements under NEPA and SEQRA).
29 Eg., West Branch Ass'n, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 576 N.Y.S.2d 675
(App. Div. 1991); New York Archaeological Council v. Town Bd. of Coxsackie,
576 N.Y.S.2d 680 (App. Div. 1991).
30 N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.2(1) (1993).
31 N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Group v. Town of Islip, 520 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y.
1988).
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of life, health, property or natural resources. ' 32 This exemption
may initially have been conceived for such conventional emergen-
cies as shoring up a dam that is about to collapse in a storm, but the
courts have extended it to gradually-developing, long-anticipated
crises such as homelessness3 3 and prison overcrowding.
34
Even where an EIS is prepared, the New York Court of Ap-
peals has declared that public release of the underlying data is not
required. The first such decision arose out of the Times Square Re-
development Project in Manhattan. The court stated that
"[n]othing in the [SEQRA] statute or regulations requires that an
agency make raw data available to the public."35 Ironically, the
issue of availability of data did not genuinely arise in that case, be-
cause the underlying data (though not the field notes) had indeed
been provided.36 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals repeated the
same rule in a challenge to DEC's adoption of water quality stan-
dards for toxic chemicals, 37 and in a challenge to a large develop-
ment project in Brooklyn. 38
The lead agency has considerable ability to require information
from the applicant,3 9 and only in rare cases-such as where the lead
agency has subjected an applicant to a long series of apparently dila-
32 N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 6 17.2(q)(4) (1993).
33 Spring-Gar Community Civic Ass'n v. Home for the Homeless, Inc., 540
N.Y.S.2d 453, 454 (App. Div. 1989); Greentree at Murray Hill Condominium v.
Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, 550 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct. 1989). See gener-
ally Ronald C. Slye, Environmental Review of Facilities for the Homeless in New
York, 3 ENVTI.. L. IN N.Y. 177 (1992); Katherine Baird Russo, Neighborhood
Character and SEQRA: Courts Struggle With Homeless Shelters, Prisons, and the
Environment, 14 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 231 (1989).
34 Board of Visitors-Marcy Psychiatric Ctr. v. Coughlin, 453 N.E.2d 1085,
1085-89 (N.Y. 1983); Silver v. Koch, 525 N.Y.S.2d 186, 188-89 (App. Div.), appeal
dismissed, 522 N.E.2d 1069, and appeal denied, 533 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1988).
35 Jackson v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429, 439 (N.Y. 1986).
36 Interview with Stephen L. Kass, counsel to defendant in Jackson (June 8,
1993).
37 Industrial Liaison Comm. v. Williams, 527 N.E.2d 274, 278 (N.Y. 1988)
(holding that "[n]othing in the statute or regulations governing environmental im-
pact statements requires an agency to make the raw data upon which its environ-
mental impact statement is based available to the public").
38 Akpan v. Koch, 554 N.E.2d 53, 59 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that "[tihere is no
requirement that the EIS contain all the raw data supporting its analysis so long as
that analysis is sufficient to allow informed consideration and comment on the is-
sues raised"). See also Residents for a More Beautiful Port Washington v. Town of
North Hempstead, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 1, 1988, at 21 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd 545 N.Y.S.2d 297
(App. Div. 1989).
39 See Meadow Brook Equities, Ltd. v. DEC, 520 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234 (App.
Div. 1987).
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tory requests-will the courts intercede.40 Other involved agencies
(those which must decide whether to approve, undertake, or fund a
project)41 cannot require further information under SEQRA,
though they can use their other statutory authority to require fur-
ther information. 42 Outside of the limited SEQRA and FOIL




One device that is available for acquiring raw data and other
information underlying project applications is a DEC adjudicatory
hearing. When a project requires a permit from the DEC, the
agency may hold an adjudicatory hearing, a trial-like proceeding in
front of a DEC-employed administrative law judge (AUl).43 Dis-
covery is available in these proceedings at the ALl's discretion."
At the hearing itself, the applicant's witnesses are subject to search-
ing cross-examination. 45 Thus, DEC adjudicatory hearings are a
very powerful tool for uncovering the data supporting the figures
and assertions contained in EIS and permit applications.
The applicant's experts are on the stand under oath, and will
4 0 g., 383 Madison Assocs. v. New York City Planning Comm'n, N.Y.I.J.,
June 20, 1988, at 25; Gordon v. Town of Bedford Planning Bd., Index No. 14653/
89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 27, 1990).
41 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 6, § 617.2(t) (1993). An "involved
agency" is an agency that has jurisdiction by law to fund, approve, or directly
undertake an action. If an agency will ultimately make a discretionary decision to
fund, approve, or undertake an action, then it is an "involved agency," notwith-
standing that it has not received an application for funding or approval at the time
the SEQRA process is commenced. The lead agency is also an "involved agency."
Id
42 See Robert Feller, The New SEQR Regulations and Nonlead Agency Deci-
sion-Making, 8 N.Y. ST. BAR ASS'N ENVTL L. SEC. J. 9 (1988). See also State v.
LGM Assoc., Index No. 7117/87 (N.Y. Sup. CL Nov. 27, 1987) (holding that
DEC's challenge was time barred where DEC, an involved agency, challenged
SEQRA determinations of a local planning board that was acting as lead agency).
43 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 6, § 624 (1993); Daniel A. Ruzow & J.
Langdon Marsh, Hearing Reports Under the Environmental Conservation Law:
Their Function, Preparation, and Importance, 2 PAcE ENvTv. L. REv. 191 (1985).
See generally Gerald M. Levine, The New York State Environmental Quality Re-
view Act of 1975: An Analysis of the Parties' Responsibilities in the Review/Permit
Request Process, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.. 1 (1983-84).
44 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.7(b)(6) (1993).
45 Id § 624.7(6) (discussing the process of the hearing and the admissibility of
evidence).
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usually have been required to turn over all their notes and computa-
tions. Attorneys who have participated in such hearings, including
this author, have frequently observed expert witnesses revealing
their serious, sometimes outcome-determinative errors under cross
examination.
DEC adjudicatory hearings, however, are being granted less
and less frequently, in the author's observation. The DEC Commis-
sioner has expressed reluctance to grant these hearings, largely be-
cause they lead to considerable delays in permit decisions. The
standard for granting such hearings is "whether the issues raised are
substantive and significant, and resolution of such issues may result
in permit denial, require major modification to the project or the
imposition of significant permit conditions. ' 46 This is very similar
to New York's standard for defeating summary judgment.47 Over
the years, the DEC has moved away from this codified standard.
Today, the actual standard applied by DEC more closely resembles
the process whereby an intervenor must establish enough objec-
tions, at the outset, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment.
48
This current standard is a far more exacting standard than the hear-
ing regulations envisioned. As a result, hearings have been denied
on major projects, such as landfills and incinerators, that a few
years ago would clearly have been subjected to hearings.
DEC still routinely holds less formal hearings at which mem-
bers of the public can make comments about applications. DEC
calls these "legislative hearings," even though they are before
ALJs.49 Such hearings, however, provide very little opportunity for
discovering new information because:
9 Hearing participants are not afforded an opportunity for
discovery;
* These hearings are typically held with only a month or two's
notice,50 and this is seldom enough time to find and hire an attorney
46 Id. § 624.6(c).
47 See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 3212(b) (McKinney 1991).
48 See, eg., Owl Energy Resources, 1993 N.Y. Envtl. LEXIS 8 (D.E.C. Feb.
26, 1993); Washington County Board of Supervisors, 1992 N.Y. Envtl. LEXIS 61
(D.E.C. Dec. 7, 1992); Sithe/Independence Power Partners, 1992 N.Y. Envtl.
LEXIS 66 (D.E.C. Nov. 9, 1992); Monroe County 1991 N.Y. Envtl. LEXIS 52
(D.E.C. July 2, 1991). See also Residents of Bergen Believe in the Env't and De-
mocracy, Inc. v. Jorling, Index No. 7879/91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 10, 1992) (up-
holding DEC refusal to hold adjudicatory hearing on proposed landfill), affd, 600
N.Y.S.2d 653 (App. Div. 1993).
49 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, §§ 621.1(i), 621.7 (1993).
5o See id. § 617.8(d).
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and experts, get answers to FOIL requests, and prepare the presen-
tation; and
* These hearings do not provide opportunity for members of
the public to question those who prepared the EIS.
For both adjudicatory and legislative hearings, no technical
assistance is available to the public. If a good-sized municipality is
opposed to the project, it usually has resources to retain the neces-
sary help. However, few community groups can afford to hire their
own experts and counsel. This situation greatly favors affluent com-
munities, and makes it difficult or impossible for middle and lower-
income communities to participate effectively in the permitting pro-
cess. Without technical assistance, the data in the EIS and the ap-
plication package are likely to be incomprehensible. Expert
assistance is required to work through these materials just as much
as a translator is required to break through a language barrier.51
After the hearing process, whatever it maybe, the proceeding
enters the judicial review phase. The question at this phase is, typi-
cally, whether the agency decision "was made in violation of lawful
procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and ca-
pricious or an abuse of discretion."5 2 Discovery is available only by
leave of the court,53 and is seldom requested or granted. 4 The
challenger is only provided with the official record, and since review
is on the record, the lead agency will typically say that anything
outside the record is unreviewable and irrelevant.
This limitation on extrinsic evidence makes perfect sense in
many contexts. However, where the issue is whether an EIS ade-
quately looked at the range of impacts a project could have, extrin-
sic evidence is essential for an informed ruling, just as it is essential
if there is an allegation of bribery or other improper influences
outside of the process. Although some federal courts have allowed
the admission of extra-record evidence in NEPA litigation,55 this
51 Cf. El Pueblo Para el Aire Limpio v. County of Kings, 22 Envfl. L Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20357 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1991) (holding that EIS and other
documents for proposed hazardous waste incinerator in Spanish-speaking area
should have been translated into Spanish).
52 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 7803(3) (McKinney 1991).
53 Id at 408.
54 See generally Coalition Against Lincoln West, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 465
N.Y.S.2d 170, 177 (App. Div.) (refusing to remand a case for further discovery
even where there was an indication that the EIS was defective), affd, 457 N.E.2d
795 (N.Y. 1983).
55 See e.g., County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1385 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978). See generally DANIEL R.
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issue has seldom been litigated under SEQRA.5 6
When it comes time for them to render a decision, the courts
have given great deference to the technical judgments of administra-
tive agencies that have approved and acted upon EISs. This holds
true both for federal courts acting under NEPA57 and state courts
applying SEQRA.58 Thus, it is quite rare for a court to hold that an
EIS prepared under SEQRA is so deficient that a decision based on
that EIS should be overturned.
5 9
CONCLUSION
As shown above, the following chain of deference operates as
part of the impact statement process: the courts will defer to the
lead agency; the lead agency, under SEQRA, will allow the appli-
cant, using its own consultants, to prepare the EIS; the consultants
know who signs their checks, and though most will not engage in
outright falsehoods, where there is to be the discretionary applica-
tion of professional judgment-which is always-that judgment will
tend to be exercised in the direction most favorable to the client,
i.e., the applicant.
Most lead agencies are not properly staffed to police this pro-
cess. Few citizen groups are either, but even those that are become
hobbled by the secrecy of the raw data, calculations, and modelling
assumptions. The end result is that applicants are often able to ma-
nipulate the process with little effective oversight from the adminis-
trative agencies, the courts, or the public.
This author would like to offer these suggestions to address the
cloud of secrecy that currently hangs over the SEQRA process:
(1) The SEQRA regulations should be amended to say that all
data, work sheets, field notes, models, and modelling assumptions
underlying information presented in EISs should be made available
for public review in a document repository.
(2) Applicants who have prepared EISs should be required to
make the EIS authors available for one or more technical meetings
with interested parties who can informally ask them about the
methodologies and data used.
MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 4.09[1][b] (2d ed. 1992).
56 See MICHAEL B. GERRARD ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REVIEW IN
NEW YORK § 7.05 (1990 & Supp. 1993).
57 See, e.g., Marsh v. Or. Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989).
58 See, e.g., Akpan v. Koch, 554 N.E.2d 53, 57 (N.Y. 1990).
59 See Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, SEQRA Update for 1991,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 27, 1992, at 3.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
[Volume 2
SECRECY IN THE EIS PROCFSS
(3) The authors of EISs should be required to attach a profes-
sional engineer's certification that the document is a fair depiction
of the nature and likely impact of the project.
(4) Reasonable access should be allowed for inspection and
sampling of project sites.
(5) Where a showing is made for its necessity, additional time
should be afforded for public comment on complex applications.
(6) DEC should return to its prior policy of liberally granting
adjudicatory hearings on major permit applications.
(7) Technical assistance grants should be given to communi-
ties to review certain kinds of permit applications. At the federal
level, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) has a provision for such grants for
neighbors of hazardous waste sites.6° Such grants should be made
more widely available, at the expense of the applicants, so that the
public can be assured that decisions with important impacts on the
environment and public health have been made based on accurate
data and sound analysis.
With adoption of the above recommendations, we would come
much closer to fulfilling the underlying objectives of both SEQRA
and FOIL-open, broadly participatory, fully-informed govern-
mental decision making.
60 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e) (1988). See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFICF, EPA's
SUPERFUND TAG PROGRAM: GRANTS BENEFTr CITIZENS BUT ADMINISTRATIVE
BARRIERS REMN (1992).
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